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This paper highlights five areas where economic analysis of terrorism
has had the greatest policy relevance during the last 30 years. These
areas involve evaluating the effectiveness of counterterrorism actions,
identifying the causes of terrorism, measuring the economic ramification
of terrorism, analyzing the time-series dynamics of terrorist events, and
formulating game-theoretic representations of terrorism. The paper’s pri-
mary novelty lies in synthesizing past research and in identifying the key
policy-relevant issues that require additional analysis. These issues in-
clude understanding the operation of global terrorist networks, ascertain-
ing the payback of counterterrorism strategies, evaluating the returns
from alternative forms of international cooperation, and investigating the
strategic aspects of suicide terrorism. A procedure for tackling each of
these policy concerns is offered.
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S
ince the four terrorist skyjackings on 11 September 2001 (hereafter, 9/11),
economists have taken a strong interest in applying economic methods to
the study of terrorism and counterterrorism. This post-9/11 effort has been,
partly, supported by the Centers of Excellence, funded by the US Depart-
ment of Homeland Security. Economic research on this topic dates back to
Landes’ (1978) study of the deterrent effects of US antiterrorism policies against
skyjackings during 1961-1976. In particular, Landes was interested in the effecti-
veness of metal detectors used to screen passengers after detectors’ installation
on 5 January 1973. Economists’ research efforts have greatly added to our un-
derstanding of terrorism by stressing a rational-choice model in which terrorists
are viewed as optimizing an objective, subject to constraints. Terrorist rationality
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but rather on their appropriate (and predictable) response to changes in their
constraints, which are determined by terrorist resources and the policy decisions
of governments. For example, official steps that make skyjackings more costly
should induce terrorists to shift to relatively less costly alternative modes of hos-
tage taking (e.g., kidnappings). Similarly, terrorists’ choices affect governments’
objectives and constraints. Given this strategic interaction among targeted go-
vernments and terrorists, game theory has proven to be a useful tool in unders-
tanding interactive choices of these bitter adversaries. This game-theoretic inte-
rest has spilled over into political science (see, e.g., Bueno de Mesquita, 2005a,
b; Powell, 2007).
Economists have also applied econometric methods to test alternative hypot-
heses – e.g., does poverty cause terrorism (Abadie, 2006; Krueger and Malecko-
va, 2003) and what is the impact of terrorism on tourism (Drakos and Kutan,
2003; Enders et al., 1992). Many terrorism-related questions have been investiga-
ted with a variety of techniques, which have included hazard (time-to-failure) mo-
dels, discrete-choice models, panel estimations, time-series estimations, and si-
multaneous equations. The latter are particularly appropriate when the
reduced-form equations derive from a game-theoretic foundation, since one
agent’s choice is not independent of those of other agents. For example, two go-
vernments’ choices of defensive and proactive measures against a common terro-
rist threat result in best-response paths that have correlated errors. Simultaneous-
equation estimations will become more prevalent as data on government actions
are available. To date, most data sets primarily record the actions of the terrorists
during incidents. With the help of empirical methods, economists have investiga-
ted the effectiveness of alternative counterterrorism policies – e.g., the impact of
retaliatory raids on the prevalence of future incidents or the influence of UN con-
ventions and resolutions on particular types of terrorist incidents.
This article has two main purposes: (i) to highlight significant economic re-
search findings to date, and (ii) to indicate fruitful areas for future economic re-
search on terrorism. The paper’s main novelty lies in identifying how economic
methods can answer essential questions that have yet to be answered. Procedures
for answering these questions are also indicated. To assist readers to understand
unanswered issues, I must first indicate where economic analysis has had the
greatest success in studying terrorism. These successes include evaluating coun-
terterrorism policies (Section 1), measuring the economic consequences of terror-
ism (Section 2), investigating the causes of terrorism (Section 3), identifying
time-series dynamics of terrorist events (Section 4), and building game-theoretic
models (Section 5). Future directions then follow and include the study of net-
worked terrorists (Section 6), the payback of alternative counterterrorism strate-
gies (Section 7), the evaluation of international cooperation (Section 8), and the
strategic analysis of suicide terrorism (Section 9). Section 10 concludes with ad-
ditional future directions.
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61. EFFECTIVENESS OF COUNTERTERRORISM POLICIES
The most important and useful contribution of economic analysis to the
study of terrorism is its development of estimates for the effectiveness of coun-
terterrorism measures. Prior to economic analysis, evaluation of alternative poli-
cies was based on casual empiricism with no quantification of policy effective-
ness. In his seminal economic study, Landes (1978) used Gary Becker’s crime
and punishment model to derive an offense function, O, to ascertain the deterrent
effect of explicit policy decisions on the number of US hijackings. The incidence
of these skyjackings was related to the offender’s estimate of the likelihood of ap-
prehension (Pa), his or her estimate of the conditional probability of conviction
and incarceration (Pc), the monetary value of the sentence (S), the cost of appre-
hension with sentencing (C), a vector of variables (Z) reflecting wealth differ-
ences between the destination country and the home country, and other variables
(income) (X). Thus, the offense function is:
O = O(Pa,P c,S ,C ,Z ,X ) [1]
in which the probability of apprehension is influenced by metal detectors after
January 1973. Offenses denote the quarterly number of skyjackings.
Landes (1978, p. 12) found that an increase in the probability of apprehen-
sion owing to metal detectors had a negative and highly significant influence on
the incidence of skyjackings – a reduction of 1.1 to 2.2 US skyjackings per quar-
ter. Other noteworthy deterrents included a higher probability of conviction and
longer prison sentences. In a second set of regressions, Landes (1978) related the
above deterrents to the length of time between skyjackings. Effective deterrents
lengthened this time interval. He showed that a greater probability of apprehen-
sion, a greater chance of conviction, and longer prison sentences slowed the ar-
rival rate of skyjackings, thereby serving as effective deterrents. Higher unem-
ployment rates increased the frequency of skyjackings so that the opportunity
costs in the home country made a difference.
Although the Landes (1978) article is a landmark, he did not account for ter-
rorists’ abilities to substitute among modes of attacks in response to the higher
metal-detector-related costs associated with skyjackings. Hence, his benefit esti-
mate for metal detectors was solely based on the fewer skyjackings that ranged
from 41 to 60 for 1973-76, and hence did not properly estimate these benefits
(Landes, 1978, p. 21). Enders and Sandler (1993, 2006) used an alternative
methodology for judging the benefits for metal detectors. In particular, they ap-
plied a vector autoregression (VAR) technique where multiple time series are in-
vestigated simultaneously to spot substitutions and complementaries among at-
tack modes. For one set of runs, they used four time series: skyjackings, other
hostage incidents (e.g., kidnappings, nonaerial hijackings, and building seizures),
attacks against protected persons (i.e., nonhostage incidents against diplomats and
other protected persons) and other incidents. Figure 1 from Enders and Sandler
(2006) displays the four time series where actual series are in broken lines and
predicted series are in solid lines. In each of the four panels, the first vertical line
at the first quarter of 1973 denotes the introduction of metal detectors. As can be
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7seen in the skyjacking panel, skyjackings dropped precipitously after metal detec-
tors were installed, consistent with Landes’ US findings; however, other kinds of
hostage incidents rose greatly at the same time, limiting the gains from metal de-
tectors. This reflects the transference of attacks, which also characterized other in-
cidents. As metal detectors were placed in embassies and government buildings
with a lag, there was a second benefit as crimes against protected persons fell. To
truly judge the effectiveness of metal detectors, a researcher must account for
negative and positive consequences of their installation.
Enders and Sandler (1993, 2006) also evaluated other policies with surpris-
ing findings. They examined the US retaliatory raid on Libya on 15 April 1986
for Libya’s involvement in terrorist bombing of the La Belle discotheque in West
Berlin on 4 April 1986, where 3 died and 231 were injured including 62 Ameri-
cans. Enders and Sandler (1993) concluded that the Libyan bombing did not
have the desired effect of reducing terrorist attacks. Instead, the US retaliatory
raid raised terrorist attacks immediately, as terrorists showed their displeasure by
moving planned future attacks into the present. Transnational terrorist attacks
then dropped temporarily as terrorists needed to plan new attacks and recoup
spent resources. Thus, terrorists displayed an intertemporal substitution of activi-
ties; however, the average number of attacks stayed unchanged. Identical find-
ings characterized the Brophy-Baermann and Conybeare (1994) study of Israeli
retaliatory raids.
Enders and Sandler (1993) also discovered that augmented mission security
reduced embassy attacks, but increased assassinations of diplomatic officials off
of embassy grounds. In addition, their study showed that UN conventions and
resolutions outlawing hostage taking, sabotage against planes, and bombings had
no effect: i.e., the relevant time series’ post-intervention mean was not signifi-
cantly different than its pre-intervention mean. This last finding casts doubts on
recommendations by some terrorist experts (e.g., Wilkinson, 2001) that interna-
tional conventions are the most effective way to fight terrorism. Finally, Enders
et al. (1990) showed that some domestic laws – the so-called Reagan get-tough
policy on terrorists – had no impact on transnational terrorist attacks against US
interests. Terrorists presumably discounted greatly the ability of the US authori-
ties to reach out and bring them to justice during the 1980s when these laws were
enacted.
The VAR methodology was recently applied by Jaeger and Paserman (2008)
to investigate the cycle of violence during the Second Intifada from September
2000 through May 2007. These authors showed that the level of Israeli casualties
Granger caused Palestinian deaths, but that the level of Palestinian casualties did
not Granger cause Israeli deaths. Thus, the Israelis retaliated in a systematic fash-
ion to attacks against its citizens, while the Palestinians did not retaliate in a sys-
tematic fashion to attacks against its people. Thus, a tit-for-tat cycle of violence
was not present. Given the uni-directional response, Israeli retribution did not
necessarily increase the violence. The authors also found that Israel tightened se-
curity (e.g., closing checkpoints) after its retribution attacks. This security mea-
sure was an effective countermeasure in controlling violence.
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.Zussman and Zussman (2006) eschewed a direct VAR approach when inves-
tigating the effectiveness of Israeli assassinations of Palestinian terrorists during
the Second Intifada. Instead, these authors applied a clever indirect approach by
studying the effects of Israeli targeted assassinations on the value of the Tel Aviv
25 index. In so doing, they used an event data analysis. If Israeli investors viewed
the assassinations as reducing terrorism, then the market index should display a
sustained rise. If, however, Israeli investors viewed the assassinations as counter-
productive, then the market index should display a sustained fall. The authors dis-
tinguished three types of assassinations: junior military personnel, senior military
leaders, and senior political leaders. As anticipated, the assassination of senior
military leaders had a sustained positive effect on stock prices, while the assassi-
nation of senior political leaders had a sustained (counterproductive) negative ef-
fect on stock prices. The murder of junior military personnel had no effect. The
study had many controls, including the murder of noncombatants which were
counterproductive.
Many other interesting economic studies have applied various methodologies
to investigate counterterrorism measures. The studies above are only representative.
2. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TERRORISM
There are essential reasons for studying the economic consequences of ter-
rorism. First, the ability of modern-day terrorists to cause hardship to a society
must be assessed. This hardship may be in terms of casualties and/or economic
losses. Al-Qaida training manuals, captured in caves in Afghanistan by US troops,
direct its followers to attack “vital economic centers” as a means to carry on the
fatwa against the infidels (WorldNetDaily, 2003). Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA)
targeted hotels and resorts in the 1980s in an effort to hurt tourism and the econo-
my in Spain (Mickolus et al., 1989). In an important paper, Abadie and Gardeaza-
bal (2003) showed that a sustained ETA campaign lost the Basque Country about
10% of its gross domestic product (GDP). Second, losses in GDP from terrorism
are a crucial component of what is saved by counterterrorism that reduces attacks,
thereby raising growth. Any exercise to compute the benefit-cost ratios of alterna-
tive counterterrorism policy requires knowledge of these GDP losses worldwide
(see section 6). Third, the economic consequences of terrorism must be calibrated
if offsetting economic stimulus packages or foreign assistance to terrorism-
plagued countries are to be determined. Many economies and economic structures
are surprisingly resilient to terrorist attacks. Chen and Siems (2004) showed that
terrorist attacks prior to 9/11 did not reduce the value of stock market indices for
more than two or three days, even though specific impacted sectors – e.g., airline
stocks – would suffer for much longer. The attacks of 9/11 reduced stock market
indices for 30-40 days (Chen and Siems, 2004); nevertheless, financial markets
rebounded surprisingly fast from 9/11.
There are four unifying principles regarding the economic impact of terror-
ism (Sandler and Enders, 2008). The immediate costs of most terrorist attacks are
localized, not unlike crime. Next, terrorism-prone sectors may suffer substantial
losses when attacked as investors and customers seek less risky sectors. Skyjack-
Revista de Economía Aplicada
10ings in the 1980s temporarily crippled the tourist industry in some countries –
e.g., Greece – until airports were made more secure (Enders et al., 2002). More-
over, large diversified economies are able to withstand some terrorism and display
relatively little macroeconomic losses. Finally, small countries plagued by a sus-
tained terrorist campaign can lose more than 10% of their GDP (Abadie and
Gardeazabal, 2003; Eckstein and Tsiddon, 2004). Developing countries are simi-
larly more susceptible to terrorism-induced economic consequences (Gaibulloev
and Sandler, 2009; Keefer and Loayza, 2008).
Why are rich diversified countries relatively immune from terrorism-induced
economic hardships? Such countries have well-honed monetary and fiscal policy
tools that can be applied to cushion the effects of a large-scale terrorist attack.
After 9/11, the Federal Reserve (FED) slashed the federal funds rate to meet a
9/11-induced demand surge for liquidity. Liquidity was also increased by the FED
encouraging banks to borrow from the FED, which more than doubled its bank
loans on 12 September (Enders and Sandler, 2006, p. 211). Fiscal policy also
played a role in speeding up the recovery after 9/11. Diversified economies facili-
tate between-sector reallocation of resources, so that resources can temporarily
exit risky sectors until confidence is restored. Also, the mere size of rich
economies means that even large-scale attacks cause losses that dwarf GDP. The
$80-90 billion loss attributed to 9/11 was less than 0.1% of the US GDP at the
time. Rich countries can also afford large security upgrades – e.g., the creation of
the US Department of Homeland Security – in order to regain confidence follow-
ing a large terrorist attack. Developing and poor less-diversified countries possess
more limited means to absorb and recover from terrorism shocks. Gaibulloev and
Sandler (2009) showed that developed countries in Asia did not display a signifi-
cant impact of transnational terrorist attacks on income per capita growth, unlike
their developing country counterparts. Developing countries lose income growth
through three avenues: reduced investment, increased government spending, and
smaller aid inflows.
Recent studies showed that terrorism has a moderate influence on income per
capita growth. Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides, (2004) examined a pooled cross-
section of 177 countries from 1968 to 2000 and discovered that each year of
transnational terrorism resulted in a drop of 0.048% in income per capita growth.
To put things into perspective, Sandler et al. (2009) used the Blomberg, Hess and
Orphanides, (2004) model to calculate the global GDP lost for 2005, given
transnational terrorism attacks that year. This lost GDP was about $17 billion, far
less than what is spent on homeland security. In a study of terrorism and Euro-
pean growth, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2008) distinguished between domestic and
transnational terrorist events, and found that domestic terrorist incidents had a
much smaller impact on growth. For Asia, Gaibulloev and Sandler (2009) demon-
strated that internal conflicts had a much greater impact on income per capita
growth than terrorism. Moreover, more populated countries were better able to
withstand terrorist attacks without displaying smaller growth.
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113. CAUSES AND ROOTS OF TERRORISM
Political scientists have been interested in the causes or roots of terrorism since
they started to study the topic (Hoffman, 2006; Wilkinson, 2001). With little sys-
tematic theoretical or empirical analysis, political scientists typically attributed the
causes to grievances or political demands in myriad forms: e.g., ethnic concerns,
economic discrimination, specific issues (i.e., abortions or animal rights), sepa-
ratism, nihilism, or nationalism. After 9/11, economists engaged in important ana-
lytic work to evaluate the popular consensus that poverty is the root of terrorism.
To investigate this consensus, economists applied a variety of empirical
tools. Using a terrorism risk index, Abadie (2006) showed that, ceteris paribus,
poverty is not a significant determinant of terrorism risks. In his study, political
freedoms are an important nonlinear determinant of terrorism risks. “Countries
with intermediate levels of political freedom are shown to be more prone to ter-
rorism than countries with high levels of political freedom or countries with high-
ly authoritarian regimes.” (Abadie, 2006, p. 51). He also found that a country’s
geophysical characteristics – larger area, higher elevation, and greater jungle
cover – are associated with a higher risk of terrorism, presumably because terror-
ists have havens to hide from government forces. In a complementary study,
Krueger and Laitin (2008) separated the terrorists’ country of origin and their
venue country, and found that political repression, not economics, explained the
transnational terrorists’ country of origin. Thus, the lack of political freedom is a
prime motivator of terrorism. Based on statistical analysis, they also established
that target countries tended to be rich. This finding agrees with Blomberg, Hess
and Weerapana (2004), who showed that richer countries in their 127-country
panel for 1968-1991 experienced more transnational terrorist attacks than poorer
countries. These authors also established that democracies are more plagued than
autocracies by transnational terrorism; however, they did not look for a quadratic
relationship like Abadie (2006). Blomberg, Hess and Weerapana (2004) also indi-
cated that transnational terrorism increased during economic downturns, consis-
tent with an opportunity costs theory of terrorism (also, see Jaeger et al., 2008).
Drakos and Gofas (2006) used a large panel – 139 countries for 1985-1998 –
to identify the characteristics of an average transnational terrorist attack venue.
These authors found that such venues had an elevated level of international dis-
putes, low economic openness, and high demographic stress. They also uncovered
a weak relationship between democracy and transnational terrorism, consistent
with democratic freedoms (e.g., freedom of association, freedom of movement,
and a target-rich environment) facilitating the practice of terrorism (Enders and
Sandler, 2006).
In summary, the picture that is emerging is that political considerations, not
poverty, are the main driver of terrorism. A redistribution of income from rich to
poor countries will do little to cure transnational terrorism. Political repression
does more to recruit terrorists than economic deprivation. Rich countries are a
venue of choice for transnational terrorist attacks for a number of reasons: oppor-
tunity provided by democratic freedoms, media coverage, and political grievances
(e.g., US foreign policy).
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methods can be readily applied to fathom the causes of homegrown and home-di-
rected domestic terrorism. Jaeger et al. (2008) investigated how government or
terrorist violence in Israel generated grievances that fueled new attacks. These au-
thors showed that Israeli violence against Palestinians increased attacks in the
short run. Public support of the terrorists grew after such violence, but dissipated
within three months. In the context of insurgencies, Iyengar and Monten (2008)
showed that public criticism of the Iraqi war in the United States emboldened in-
surgents, especially in areas of Iraq with access to such information. This effect
led to more attacks against US forces, but disappeared in about a month. Berman
et al. (2008) also examined factors affecting the intensity of the Iraqi insurgency,
and established that the provision of public services curbed violence. I must, how-
ever, emphasize that insurgency differs from terrorism. An insurgency seeks to
overthrow a government with guerrilla tactics, which may include terrorism. In
contrast, terrorists may seek other political goals with much more limited vio-
lence.
4. TIME-SERIES DYNAMICS
Given the collection of event data sets with daily observations dating back to
1968, time-series analysis has been applied by many studies of terrorism and
counterterrorism (Enders, 2007). A favorite tool is intervention analysis, in which
an event or shock is indicated in a time-series equation as a one-period (pulse) in-
fluence or as a continual (level) influence. At other times, the intervention is al-
lowed to have a gradual increasing or decreasing impact. Until recently, interven-
tions were prespecified by the researcher to capture an explicit policy intervention
or a major event (e.g., 9/11) (Enders and Sandler, 1993, 2005). This practice may
add bias and is apt to miss other important changepoints, where the arrival rate of
new incidents changes its slope. Thus, state-of-the-art methods now allow the data
to identify the changepoints. Another issue concerns aggregation in time-series
analysis. The initial studies on terrorist event dynamics used quarterly observa-
tions, which can hide cyclical components and hamper inferences about structural
changes. This aggregation was used to abide by the normality assumption under-
lying autoregressive integrated moving average (ARIMA) models. A monthly
time series of, say, kidnappings may have some zeros or near-zero observations,
which violates the normality assumption of ARIMA, since negative values for in-
cidents are not allowed. By using event count time-series methods based on Pois-
son or negative binomial distributions, a researcher can now analyze “thin” series
with some zero values and investigate more disaggregated time series. Thus, re-
cent time-series papers on terrorism used more disaggregated time series (e.g.,
Barros and Gil-Alana, 2006) and did not prespecify intervention points. More-
over, estimated models now include covariates (e.g., past concessions in hostage
incidents) in order to calculate short-run and long-run multipliers tied to explicit
actions of the authorities.
To illustrate the applied power of these studies, I briefly consider the study of
Brandt and Sandler (2009) on the dynamics of hostage taking. These authors
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13separated hostage-taking incidents into three time series: kidnappings, skyjack-
ings, and others (i.e., nonaerial hijackings and the takeover of buildings with
hostages). In kidnappings, hostages are secured in locations typically unknown to
the authorities; in skyjackings and other hostage events, hostages are secured in
location known to the authorities. Thus, hostage takers are less vulnerable in kid-
nappings, which may affect policy consequences.
Brandt and Sandler (2009) investigated whether concessions to hostage takers
really generated new hostage incidents, as embodied in the conventional wisdom.
The latter is based on the subgame perfect equilibrium notion that if would-be
hostage takers truly believe a government’s pledge never to concede to terrorist de-
mands, then terrorists will never abduct hostages since there is no payoff from
doing so (see section 5). With advanced time-series methods, Brandt and Sandler
(2009) found that conceding to kidnappers’demands resulted in 2.62 additional ab-
ductions, lending strong support for the conventional wisdom. However, conces-
sions generated fewer additional skyjackings – just 0.6 more incidents. Apparently,
location makes a difference. Violent ends to incidents dissuaded future skyjackings
but not future kidnappings. Kidnappers presumably reasoned that other groups’
mistakes, leading authorities to storm their hideouts, did not necessarily apply to
them if they did a better job in keeping their whereabouts unknown.
Brandt and Sandler (2009) used daily observations of incidents when ascer-
taining changepoints for the three hostage-taking time series. For each series, the
data pointed to breaks previously unidentified in earlier studies. New change-
points were associated with hot spots (e.g., skyjacking in the Soviet Union prior
to the fall of communism), policies previously unidentified (e.g., the deployment
of the multinational force to Lebanon in 1983), and political events (e.g., Abu
Ghraib abuses). In the case of Abu Ghraib, a wave of kidnappings throughout the
Middle East followed the revelation of prisoner abuse by US soldiers. These au-
thors also established that skyjackings and kidnappings are negatively correlated,
while skyjackings and other hostage events are positively correlated. The negative
correlation is indicative of substitutes, while the positive correlation is indicative
of complements. Substitute and complement hostage-taking incidents imply poli-
cy insights: isolated actions to thwart skyjackings may result in more kidnap-
pings, while isolated actions to curb skyjackings may also reduce other hostage
incidents.
There are a wide range of policy issues that can be investigated with these
advanced time-series methods. For example, policy-induced substitutions among
terrorist targets – i.e., businessmen, officials, tourist, military personnel, and oth-
ers – have never been studied. As governments and businesses heightened security
around their personnel, the general public is increasingly targeted.
5. GAME-THEORETIC ANALYSIS
Game theory (i.e., the study of strategic rational choice) is an appropriate
tool to capture the strategic interactions among various agent pairings: e.g., the
terrorists and the government, two or more targeted countries, rival terrorist
groups (e.g., Fatah and Hamas), the political and military wings of a terrorist
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14group, and terrorists and their supporters. Other strategic interactions may involve
terrorists, the media, and a targeted government (Rohner and Frey, 2007), or a ter-
rorist leader, suicide terrorists, and the general public. Since 9/11, there has been
a great deal of interest in game analyses of terrorism, which has been the subject
of recent surveys (Sandler and Arce, 2007; Sandler and Siqueira, 2009). Thus, my
goal here is merely to highlight a few interesting nonobvious results.
When a government allocates its defensive resources among alternative po-
tential targets, Bier et al. (2007) showed that some locations may be best left un-
defended. Moreover, a centralized allocation is preferable to decentralized one,
thereby making a case for an entity such as the Department of Homeland Securi-
ty. Centralized defense allows the government to internalize possible externalities
that arise based on the relative hardness of targets, with softer targets attracting
more attacks. If an attack is inevitable somewhere because the terrorists are deter-
mined and all targets cannot be guarded equally, then it stands to reason that at-
tacks should be guided to low-value targets. This then implies that defensive allo-
cations be made public rather than secret.
Another issue involves proactive and defensive measures against a transna-
tional terrorist group that targets multiple countries. Proactive policies are offen-
sive as a government confronts the terrorists or their supporters directly. Actions
intended to destroy terrorist training camps, to freeze terrorists’ funding, to retali-
ate against state-sponsors of terrorism, or to infiltrate a terrorist group are proac-
tive. In contrast, defensive measures protect potential targets either by making at-
tacks more costly for the terrorists or by reducing their likelihood of success. In
light of an attack, defensive actions can also limit the losses. Defensive measures
by one country to make entry into the country more difficult may result in the ter-
rorists targeting that country’s interests abroad. When countries independently
make defensive decisions, there is a tendency to engage in a defense race with tar-
geted countries overspending (Sandler and Lapan, 1988). This overspending is at-
tenuated if each targeted nation has interests abroad.
Proactive measures are like pure public goods where actions against a com-
mon terrorist threat confer security benefits on all at-risk countries. There is con-
sequently a desire to free ride on the proactive response of others. As targeted na-
tions sit back and wait for others to confront the terrorists and their supporters,
offensive measures are undersupplied (Sandler and Siqueira, 2006). If action is
taken, then it is usually by the prime-target country that has the most to gain from
a diminished threat. This free-riding concern does not apply to domestic terrorism
since a targeted country cannot rely on other countries to act, since it is the sole
target of the attacks. 
Game theory has also enlightened policy in terms of negotiation responses in
hostage incidents. Lapan and Sandler (1988) investigated whether a government’s
pledge never to concede to terrorists would keep terrorists from taking hostages, as
presupposed by the alleged subgame perfect equilibrium. These authors first al-
lowed the targeted government to choose a level of deterrence that determines the
likelihood of a terrorist logistical failure when abducting hostages. Based on their
perceived likelihood of logistical success or failure and also on their perceived
likelihood of negotiated success or failure, the terrorists decide whether or not to
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15take hostages. The game has four endpoints: no attack; an attack that fails logisti-
cally; an attack that captures one or more hostages but results in no concessions;
and an attack that captures one or more hostages and results in concessions. Lapan
and Sandler (1988) showed that if the government’s pledge not to concede is be-
lieved, then the terrorists may still abduct hostages. This occurs when the terrorists
view there to be a net gain from holding hostages even in the absence of payment –
say, from publicity. Terrorists may even view a logistical failure as having benefits
if martyrdom is valued.
Lapan and Sandler (1988) concluded that the pledged never-concede policy
hinges on at least five implicit assumptions: (i) the government’s deterrence is suf-
ficient to stop all attacks; (ii) the government’s pledge is fully credible to all poten-
tial hostage takers; (iii) the terrorists’ gain from hostage taking derives only from
fulfillment of their demands; (iv) there is no uncertainty concerning the costs from
having hostages abducted; and (v) the government’s costs from making conces-
sions always exceed those of holding firm. Each of these assumptions is suspect in
practice. Since there are so many potential hostages to take and a government can-
not guard everyone, no deterrent effort can stop all hostage taking. A government’s
pledge is never fully credible because of past transgressions by earlier govern-
ments. The terrorists reason that if they capture the right hostage – e.g., the daugh-
ter of a prime minister – then the government will make an exception. If terrorists
value publicity and martyrdom, then their failures may have perceived positive re-
turns so that formidable deterrence and maintained pledges will not end all hostage
seizures. Moreover, uncertainty is always present because the government does not
know beforehand who will be abducted. If a sufficiently valued hostage is seized,
then breaking its pledge may be less costly to the government. Thus, time-incon-
sistent decisions are a real concern. To limit this time inconsistency, a constitution-
al amendment must eliminate a government’s discretion to break its pledge owing
to unforeseen circumstances. Policies that make a government value its reputation
will also reduce time-inconsistent pledges. Terrorists may try to circumvent these
countermoves by abducting a targeted country’s hostage abroad, where the venue
country is seen as conducting the negotiations.
6. FUTURE DIRECTIONS 1: NETWORKED TERRORISTS
Since 9/11, transnational terrorists are understood to operate in loosely tied
networks that include terrorist groups from many countries. In particular, al-Qaida
has assembled a global network of Islamic fundamentalist terrorists that includes
terrorist groups in Africa, the Middle East, Eurasia, Asia, and elsewhere (Hoff-
man, 2006, pp. 285-9). The al-Qaida network has been described as a global
brand name, a franchise, an umbrella group, or a venture-capital firm (Cronin,
2006; Hoffman, 2006; Sageman, 2004).
Because the main terrorist threat confronting the world is a network, terror-
ism and counterterrorism research needs to do more to include the network in its
theoretical and empirical constructs. One approach to addressing networks has
been mathematical, based on graph theory (see, e.g., Farley, 2003). This approach
identifies where efforts by the authorities can do the maximal damage to the in-
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teresting, it begs some key questions. First, the government must discover the net-
work’s structure, which the terrorists will try to keep secret. Second, terrorist net-
works are surely not static, but are continually evolving over time. If the network
structure is discovered from seized computers or intercepted communications,
then the terrorists have a strong incentive to alter the structure. Even in the ab-
sence of such seizures or intelligence, the structure is changing as missions are
created and new groups join the network. Third, the terrorists realize that their
network is vulnerable and, hence, will keep connectivity loose to limit the impor-
tance of linkages (Enders and Su, 2006). The creation of parallel structures and
redundancies augments the reliability of the network. Terrorists will compose
cells based on long-term friendships and family relationships to inhibit infiltra-
tion. Fourth, the terrorists can release false information about their network to di-
rect the authority’s efforts to nonexistent or inessential linkages.
As terrorists adjust the connectivity of their network, they face a trade-off be-
tween their ability to conduct missions (the benefits of connectivity) and their vul-
nerability from counterterrorism (the costs of connectivity). These marginal bene-
fits and costs of connectivity have been examined by Enders and Su (2006) in an
effort to describe an optimized network that equates these margins. In more recent
work, Enders and Jindapon (2008) have included network externalities where cell
members gain benefits from friends and family members in tightly knit cells.
These benefits are in addition to those from terrorist operations. Enders and Jin-
dapon (2008) also investigated the impact that government countermeasures have
on the evolving optimized network. Bringing such strategic aspects into the study
of networks is a promising avenue.
In a different approach that does not stress linkage connectivity, Siqueira and
Sandler (2008) introduced strategic influences in a study of a global network with
four distinct agents: a general terrorist organization (GTO), a local terrorist group
in each country, local supporters of the groups, and a targeted government in each
country. To include so many agents, the authors devise a three-stage game where
there are no more than two active agents at any given stage. In stage 1, the GTO
chooses its n representative groups to engage in terrorist activities in n countries.
The GTO attempts not only to maximize its global net gains from the terrorist
campaign, but also the benefits from its supporters. Stage 2 concerns the terror-
ism-counterterrorism decisions of the local terrorist group and the targeted gov-
ernment in each country. Each local terrorist group maximizes its net benefits
from terrorism, while ignoring local supporters. The host government has its citi-
zen’s welfare at heart and minimizes aggregate losses from terrorism and expens-
es from counterterrorism. Finally, terrorist supporters decide their participation in
stage 3 as they maximize their utility while accounting for budget and time con-
straints.
When the GTO approves local groups, it makes a delegation decision and
may choose groups that are more or less bloodthirsty than it. This decision re-
flects the orientation of the targeted government and the GTO’s perceptions of the
fervor of the local supporters. If, for example, the GTO views the targeted govern-
ment to be weak (i.e., reducing counterterrorism efforts in response to added at-
The Past and Future of Terrorism Research
17tacks) and supporters to be enthusiastic, then the GTO will dispatch a local group
that is more violent than itself. Changes in local government orientation may
make the GTO come to regret its choice. Once deployed in the field, the GTO has
little ability to recall a local group. Siqueira and Sandler (2008) also showed that
when both the GTO and the host government delegate responsibility to surrogates,
the delegators may be worse off. Much more work on networks in a strategic
framework is needed.
7. FUTURE DIRECTION 2: EVALUATING COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGIES
Since 9/11, many at-risk governments have allocated increasing funds to
counterterrorism without necessarily determining the net payback on their grow-
ing expenditures. Between 2003 and 2005, the US Department of Homeland Se-
curity budget rose from $31.18 billion in 2003 to $40.17 billion in 2005 (Enders
and Sandler, 2006, p. 232). The department’s request for 2009 is $50.5 billion.
Over 60% of this budget goes to homeland security. No matter what year is con-
sulted, US homeland security spending displays a common trend: expenditures in-
creasing at greater than the inflation rate. Even larger US spending increases are
associated with proactive action in terms of spending on intelligence and opera-
tions in Afghanistan against the Taliban and al-Qaida. Similar scenarios are true
for some other countries confronted by threats from transnational terrorism.
One must wonder how much counterterrorism is enough. At what point,
should the share of GDP devoted to counterterrorism stop increasing or even de-
cline? Surprisingly, there have been few studies to investigate this question. As
part of the Copenhagen Consensus 2008, Sandler et al. (2009) attempted to come
up with benefit-cost ratios for various scenarios: (i) business as usual (the post-
9/11 actions), (ii) greater international cooperation; (iii) increased proactive mea-
sures, and (iv) augmented defensive measures. For each scenario, the authors con-
structed informed counterfactuals on how many fewer attacks and casualties
(deaths and injured) would have resulted. There are three basic drivers for these
authors’benefit-cost calculations. On the benefit side, there are the reduced losses
in GDP and the fewer casualties from the proposed action; on the cost side, there
is the expense of the contemplated action. For business as usual, increase proac-
tive measures, and augmented defensive actions, the payback on extra spending is
quite adverse because proactive and/or defensive costs dwarf the tens of billions
of US dollars of saved GDP and the mere millions of US dollars gained from
fewer casualties. For an average year, only 420 people died in transnational terror-
ist events and another 1249 were injured; thus, the money saved from reduced ca-
sualties are rather modest compared with lost GDP and security spending.
For alternative assumptions, each dollar spent on business as usual returned
from 4 to 9.5 cents on a dollar. An increased proactive campaign against al-Qaida
had an estimated return of 5 to 12 cents on a dollar, while augmented defensive
measures had a better anticipated return of 28 to 30 cents on a dollar. In all three
cases, the payback was very disappointing, thus making one think about resource
allocation in the “war on terror.” The only favorable scenario is international co-
operation. The Sandler et al. (2009) study needs to be greatly fine-tuned. There
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drivers – to improve the calculations. This initial study offers a methodology that
can be improved.
8. FUTURE DIRECTION 3: EVALUATING INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION
Another important benefit-cost calculation involves various forms of interna-
tional cooperation in counterterrorism activity. When nations address the common
threat of transnational terrorism, there is a proclivity to spend too little on proac-
tive measures and too much on defensive efforts. As a consequence, we live in an
overly defended but unsafe world. These spending tendencies are bolstered by na-
tions that place a high value on their autonomy in regards to security and defense
matters. This cooperation failure provides terrorists with safe havens and the
means to fund their operations through money transfers in less vigilant nations
(Sandler, 2005). International cooperation comes from the International Monetary
Fund and related institutions in their efforts to track suspicious money transfers. It
also stems from activities of the United Nations to coordinate members’ antiter-
rorism activities. Informal linkages among police forces and intelligence agencies
in two or more countries also represent this cooperation. I shall briefly focus on
how to evaluate the benefit-cost ratios of coordination actions of INTERPOL.1
After 9/11, INTERPOL focused some of its crime-fighting efforts in helping
countries in their counterterrorism activities. In particular, INTERPOL issues ar-
rest notices and diffusions for suspected terrorists and shares information about
terrorist threats and innovations. I-24/7 connects INTERPOL’s 187 countries con-
tinually to its databases. The Command and Coordination Center of INTERPOL
is staffed by analysts who respond to member countries’ requests for information.
Recently, INTERPOL created Fusion Task Forces to track and assist countries in
their capture of suspected terrorists in six defined geographical regions. INTER-
POL has gathered an extensive and growing database on stolen and lost travel
documents (SLTD) that can be accessed instantaneously by border officials in
member countries in order to stop potential terrorists from crossing borders. Other
counterterrorism measures of INTERPOL include incident response teams, a
weapons and explosives tracking system, a suspected terrorist database, and
bioterrorism program. INTERPOL facilitates the antiterrorism activities of mem-
ber countries through its database, training programs, and best practices work-
shops. INTERPOL does not arrest terrorists; rather, it facilitates efforts in some of
these arrests. Countries’police make the arrests.
In 2008, the INTERPOL budget was 48 million Euros, over 80% of which
came from member nations’assessments. The remainder was from voluntary con-
tributions. To uncover the costs of INTERPOL’s counterterrorism activities, a re-
searcher must identify the share of the budget going to such efforts. INTERPOL
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(1) The work on INTERPOL describes an ongoing project with Daniel Arce and Walter Enders,
based on data supplied by INTERPOL.has six priority areas: (i) public safety and terrorism; (ii) financial and high-tech
crime; (iii) trafficking in human beings; (iv) drugs and organized crime; (v) bring-
ing fugitives to justice; and (vi) anti-corruption. Relevant expenditures by IN-
TERPOL on counterterrorism include the budgets of public safety and terrorism
division (which pays for the fusion task forces), I-24/7, incident response teams,
the Command and Coordination Center, SLTD, and counterterrorism workshops.
Since much of this counterterrorism activity is only in the last few years, a bene-
fit-cost analysis is best done for 2006 on.
Benefits are much more difficult than costs to calculate because the former
depends on counterfactuals as to the number of incidents and casualties in the ab-
sence of INTERPOL. One way to proceed is to acquire terrorist arrest data stem-
ming from INTERPOL arrest notices. Each terrorist arrest may, conservatively,
result in one less terrorist incident. One can then use databases on transnational
terrorist events to ascertain how many people are killed or injured in an average
reduced incident. Thus, value of life and injuries calculations can then translate
these reduced casualties from arrests (and fewer incidents) into a component ben-
efit figure. 
Another benefit is associated with saved GDP losses from fewer incidents.
The Blomberg, Hess and Orphanides (2004) empirical model, relating transna-
tional terrorist attack to reduced growth worldwide, can be used to translate fewer
incidents from arrests into saved GDP. The sum of the benefit components from
reduced casualties and saved GDP must be divided by INTERPOL’s counterter-
rorism costs to produce the sought-after figure. If this ratio is much greater than
one, then budget increases for such activities in INTERPOL antiterrorism actions
are warranted. Initial calculations have given huge benefit-cost ratios for even the
most conservative estimates. 
These kinds of counterfactual exercises – though tedious – should be applied
to other kinds of joint efforts to address transnational terrorism. Economists have
much to offer in guiding policy to high payback activities.
9. FUTURE DIRECTION 4: STRATEGIC ANALYSIS OF SUICIDE TERRORISM
Since the 1983 suicide car bombings of the US Marine barracks and French
Paratroopers headquarters in Beirut, suicide bombings have been increasingly
used by terrorists to kill and terrorize target populations. The Hezbollah bombings
in 1983 demonstrated the effectiveness of such heinous attacks to other terrorists
worldwide. Suicide terrorist attacks have been used in Sri Lanka, Israel, Russia,
Indonesia, Afghanistan, England, Iraq, and elsewhere. On average, suicide attacks
kill eleven times more people than conventional terrorist attacks. (Pape, 2005)
Economists view suicide terrorists as rational agents, provided that their mis-
sions further the group’s goals. Moreover, perpetrators must view the expected
utility of their sacrifice to exceed the expected utility of living. This, in turn, re-
quires the terrorists to value consequences after death. The attacker’s expected
utility of self-sacrifice can be increased by some of the following: rewards in the
afterlife accorded to a martyr (Berman and Laitin, 2005), the prestige and friend-
ship given to the bomber prior to his or her mission (Wintrobe, 2005), the public
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bomber’s family (Berman and Laitin, 2005).
To date, various player combinations – e.g., terrorist operatives (Azam,
2005), suicide bomber and terrorist group’s leader (Berman and Laitin, 2005), the
government and the terrorist group (Jacobson and Kaplan, 2007), and the govern-
ment, the terrorist operatives, and the terrorist group (Bueno de Mesquita, 2005b)
– have been included in game-theoretic representations of suicide terrorists. Many
crucial ingredients are missing in particular investigations. To succeed, a strategic
model of suicide terrorism must possess some key ingredients. First, it must con-
tain a rich set of players that includes the suicide bomber, the group’s decision
maker, the targeted government, and the public. Given the need for three to four
strategic players, at least two stages to the game are needed. Second, the model
needs to account for the presence of both suicide and conventional attacks, be-
cause no terrorist group relies solely on suicide attacks. How government actions
can affect the mix between suicide and conventional terrorist attacks would en-
lighten policymaking. Third, the analysis must allow for corner solutions with re-
spect to the perpetrator, who is willing to give up life itself. The presence of a cor-
ner solution means that governmental policy changes that marginally alter the
price of terrorists’ actions may have no impact on the suicide bomber; thus, small
changes in deterrence that make suicide bombings more difficult may achieve lit-
tle. Effective policies must either involve large deterrents or else get at the terror-
ists’ motivation. Fourth, targeted countries confront a trade-off between aggres-
sive counterterrorism policies that harden targets but further terrorist group
solidarity, and concessions that reduce support for terrorist groups, but leave tar-
gets more exposed. If the government applies very harsh measures, then this can
result in a backlash and further recruitment of suicide terrorists.
On the empirical side, some notable papers investigated the demand and sup-
ply side of suicide terrorists. For example, Benmelech and Berrebi (2007, p. 236)
showed that Palestinian terrorist leaders matched “older and more-educated suicide
bombers to more important Israeli targets.” In addition, such bombers were less apt
to fail logistically, compared with their younger and less-educated counterparts.
These interesting findings demonstrate that terrorist leaders are indeed rational
when choosing their operatives (Krueger, 2008). In a subsequent study, Benmelech
et al. (2009) showed that opportunity cost is an essential factor determining the
“quality” of terror or the outcome of suicide bombings. During depressed times,
Palestinian terrorist leaders were able to recruit better educated individuals to carry
out suicide attacks. These studies highlight the importance of the interaction be-
tween the suicide bombers and their handlers. They also underscore the importance
of the rationality assumption even applied to suicide terrorism.
10. OTHER DIRECTIONS AND CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper has identified some of the most important economic research find-
ings to date. In deciding the five areas to highlight, I have focused on the most
policy-relevant areas. Few would quibble over the importance of studies that have
engineered methods for measuring counterterrorism policy effectiveness. A sec-
The Past and Future of Terrorism Research
21ond crucial contribution involves studies identifying the economic ramifications
of terrorism. Here, disagreement is more likely to concern which particular stud-
ies to discuss, since there have been many excellent articles in this study area. Re-
cent studies have enlightened us about the causes of terrorism. Time-series dy-
namics continue to add to our understanding of terrorism and will continue to do
so as this method is refined. Finally, game-theoretic studies have investigated a
wide range of policy-oriented topics. 
The last half of the paper selectively indicated four areas that deserve further
study because of their importance in the current era of fundamentalist terrorists.
Many other directions are worth pursuing. For example, experimental economics
can enlighten policy choices by governments, confronted by a common terrorist
threat. Since proactive and defensive policy choices are analogous to a public
good contribution and commons game, respectively, past experiments on these
game forms can be modified to study counterterrorism. There are many questions
with respect to foreign aid and terrorism. For example, can foreign aid be used ef-
fectively by a donor nation to curb a global terrorism threat, as the United States
tried to do in its support of Pakistan? In the past, defensive and proactive counter-
measures have been examined in isolation. An analysis of the interplay of these
two kinds of policies is required, insofar proactive measures affect the need for
defensive actions and vice versa (Bandyopadhyay and Sandler, 2008). A rich
agenda for future research on terrorism and counterterrorism exists. 
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RESUMEN
Este artículo destaca cinco áreas donde el análisis económico del terro-
rismo ha tenido mayor relevancia en las políticas de los últimos 30 años.
Estas áreas son la evaluación de la efectividad de las acciones contra el
terrorismo, la identificación de las causas del terrorismo, la medición de
las consecuencias económicas del terrorismo, el análisis de la dinámica
de las series temporales de actos terroristas y la formulación de represen-
taciones del terrorismo basadas en la teoría de juegos. La principal nove-
dad del artículo es que sintetiza investigaciones anteriores e identifica las
cuestiones más importantes en las políticas que requieren un análisis adi-
cional. Estas cuestiones permiten entender cómo operan las redes globa-
les de terrorismo, evaluar los resultados de las estrategias antiterroristas
y de formas alternativas de cooperación internacional e investigar los as-
pectos estratégicos del terrorismo de suicidas. Se ofrece un procedimiento
para tratar cada una de estas políticas.
Palabras clave: terrorismo, contraterrorismo, análisis coste beneficio, teo-
ría de juegos, efectividad de las políticas, consecuencias económicas.
JEL classification: D74, H41, H56.
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